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Introduction
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a key player at the center of world politics. Regardless of whether the years 2004 and 2005 are cited as a "turning point in Chinese diplomacy" (Lam 2006: 160) or whether the first evidence of the state leadership's "growing assertiveness" in global politics is dated back to 2006 (Medeiros 2009: 187-188 in the 1990s, both of which laid the foundation for "increased international activism" (Goldstein 2005: 119) and the country's "emergence as an active player in the international arena" (Medeiros and Fravel 2003: 22) . Be it through the world climate talks, the reform of the global economic and financial system or international security challenges, the country's leadership is seizing its chances to contribute to the building of a multipolar international system and to protect and pursue its interests in global politics.
In advancing its objectives, China's leadership does not operate by itself. A central feature of the country's rise in international affairs has been its ability to align and cooperate with other states. In recent years Beijing has coordinated policy positions and jointly enhanced diplomatic leverage by drawing on intergovernmental clubs with (re)emerging powers in the context of BRICS and BASIC, and with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -although with varying degrees of success. Within the BRICS group, for instance, China finds rhetorical support for its commitment to multilateral diplomacy and the foreign policy principles of nonaggression and noninterference in domestic affairs. In 2011, Brazil, Russia, India and China abstained from the vote on the "No-
Fly Zone" resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), claiming that the Libyan crisis should be ended using diplomatic means.
2 Although this consensus crumbled in early 2012 when the council began voting on Syria, the BRICS members still managed to insist that any solutions to the crises in Syria and Iran should be based on political dialogue. (Medeiros 2009: 64, 85) .
The time in which China was "bereft of friends," "a beacon to no one -and, indeed, an ally to no one" is thus certainly over (Segal 1999: 33; see also Sutter 2003 Strezhnev and Voeten (2012) and calculate a novel chancecorrected similarity measure that has been proposed by Häge (2011) .
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on China's economic and political rise, focusing on studies that assess the country's regional and global influence and relevant diplomatic strategies. Second, I discuss different explanations for foreign policy similarity, drawing mainly on literature on vote buying in the UN and on policy convergence, and formulate corresponding hypotheses. In the third section I present the research design and provide a more detailed description of the dependent variable, foreign policy similarity with China, and its development over the period from 1990 to 2011. In the fourth section, I present and discuss the quantitative results. The conclusion summarizes the paper's findings and points out further areas of research.
China's Political Sway: Existing Research
Studies within the "China rise" literature address Beijing's ability to win other countries' support for its own political objectives in global and regional affairs mainly as a consequence of its trade and financial power. Lampton (2008) identifies five economic dimensions of China's growing international heft: the "power of the buyer, the seller, the investor, the development assistance provider, and the innovator" (ibid.: 88, italics in original). According to Zhu (2010: 2) , the country's economic resilience and its stockpile of foreign exchange reserves make "it possible for China to expand trade and investment and enhance its political influence in every corner of the world." Due to its trade relations with weak and fragile states, China is in a particularly beneficial position to use its economic leverage to influence such countries (Hart and Jones 2010) . In Africa, both trade and largely untied foreign aid (except for the One-China policy) translate into political power as they "help to cultivate the goodwill of African leaders who provide Beijing with diplomatic support and valuable contracts as a matter of reciprocity" (Tull 2006: 476, 468) . In other regions, however, the payoff of such economic strategies seems less obvious. As Jenkins (2010: 830) has observed, except for in the smaller countries in Central America and the Caribbean, "there are limited opportunities in Latin America for China to increase its influence through grants and concessionary loans" (see also Breslin 2011; Drezner 2009 ).
If we take a closer look, we see that even in Asia evidence of China's economic leverage is less conclusive than is often assumed. After conducting several case studies on Chinese attempts to exert power in Southeast Asia, Goh (2011: 24) Outside the economic realm, China's rise in international affairs and its ability to win political support has been related to the Communist leadership's embracing of soft-power strategies and its appeal as a development model, particularly to authoritarian countries in less developed world regions (Lampton 2008: 141-142) . For instance, with the exception of Singapore and Vietnam, the Southeast Asian countries did not approve Tokyo's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC and thus gave in to Beijing's diplomatic campaigns (Yoshimatsu 2008: 15) . Soft power is further believed to have helped China's leadership gain influence both in Asian and
African countries, and to a lesser degree also in Latin American countries (Ellis 2011b; Kurlantzick 2007 Kurlantzick , 2009 Sutter 2003) . 6 However, one has to bear in mind that soft power from a Chinese perspective entails "anything outside the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations" (Kurlantzick 2007: 6 ; see also Glaser and Dooley 2009 ).
For other authors, China's emergence as an influential power in international politics has been facilitated by a general shift from a "responsive" to a "proactive diplomacy," state and public diplomacy, and attempts to reshape regional orders (Zhang 2010: 41; Zhu 2010: 6-7) .
One important aspect of this shift has been the establishment of comprehensive and strategic partnerships with individual countries, which serve as diplomatic instruments for China to expand international influence and "generate bargaining leverage in its bilateral interactions" (Medeiros 2009: 86 ; see also Cheng and Zhang 2002) . This logic is also translated to the multilateral context, where it takes the form of "forum diplomacy," through which Beijing has been able to engage large groups of countries and facilitate Chinese influence in the respective regions (Medeiros 2009; Su 2009; Zhang 2010) .
Drivers of Foreign Policy Similarity
The above-cited works provide a great deal of knowledge on China's use of diplomacy and economic statecraft to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence supporting these assumptions is often anecdotal and, with regard to the more systematic studies, the results are not only ambiguous but also restricted to tools of economic statecraft as the main explanatory factors.
This paper argues that a better understanding of the similarities in the foreign policy interests of China and other states is gained by taking a step back and considering the Chinese 6 Other authors, in contrast, argue that generally and despite the importance the Chinese leadership attaches to soft power and public diplomacy, the soft-power strategy has so far had only limited success (Gill and Huang 2006: 26; Li 2009: 16 ). 
Shared Institutional and Socioeconomic Attributes
Influence through bilateral linkages is regarded as an important driving force behind foreign policy similarity. However, the likelihood of influence transmission within bilateral relations depends on country-specific conditions: Studies on policy convergence, for instance, cite shared institutional characteristics, similar socioeconomic structures, and cultural likeness as factors which further facilitate cross-national policy transfers (Knill 2005) . In addition, countries facing parallel problems are expected to choose similar solutions (Holzinger and Knill 2005) . Countries integrated in comparable ways in global political and economic processes and exposed to similar problems, for instance, should be more likely to formulate parallel policy responses, especially in a context of shared institutional, socioeconomic and cultural attributes.
That said, foreign policy similarity may exist independently from bilateral linkages and China's diplomatic strategies. Politically like-minded countries may vote the same as China due to domestic interests. Empirical studies on voting behavior in the UNGA demonstrate that democratic governments are more inclined to vote with the US and other G7 countries because of shared principles (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Voeten 2000) . 7 Taking the reverse of this argument, it can be assumed that countries characterized by nondemocratic
principles and values such as restrictions on freedom of expression, limited possibilities to participate in the political process, low competitiveness of representation and weak rule of law tend to vote the same as China -independently of the intensity of economic, military or diplomatic ties. Many politically "like-minded" countries, for instance, voted together with China against the UNGA resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar in 2010. 8 With its concern that "information transmitted via the Internet could threaten the 'stability' of states," China figures among several other authoritarian countries in the list of states which have co-sponsored Russian resolutions on cyber security in the UNGA (Gjelten 2010 ).
The arguments made above lead to an initial set of hypotheses: 7 Wang (1999: 205) argues that "developing countries with higher levels of democracy would vote more frequently with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly than less democratic countries" because they "share such principles as free speech, private property, elected representation, and other political interests." See Kim and Russett (1996: 648) for further evidence that more democratic countries support resolutions on human and political rights whereas less democratic countries are more inclined to favor self-determination. Hypothesis 1a: "Like-minded" countries tend to align more often with China's foreign policy interests independently of the existence of bilateral linkages due to shared institutional characteristics.
Hypothesis 1b:
Pressure from parallel problems induces similar foreign policy choices independently of the existence of bilateral linkages.
Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Linkages
For the transmission of influence, bilateral linkage, understood as dense ties between China and other states, is nevertheless a precondition (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53, 54) . It is anticipated that influence transmitted through bilateral ties is not limited to the direct imposition of policies but also operates on more indirect terms through the facilitation of anticipatory obedience as well as lesson-drawing, transnational policy coordination and political cooperation (Bennett 1991; Holzinger and Knill 2005 ).
Economic linkages not only facilitate denser bilateral contacts but also enable the Chinese government to use tools of economic statecraft (for example, control of imports, facilitation of trade, and direct investment, as well as the granting of aid) to exert influence over the policy decisions of its economically weaker partners (Baldwin 1985; Deibel 2007; Mastanduno 2008) .
High levels of foreign policy alignment should thus be expected in less developed countries where China has a significant presence as a buyer of natural resources, a provider of foreign investment or a donor of untied aid. In the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, for instance, the Chinese government demonstrated how its economic power may have contributed to convincing African states not to support India's bid for a permanent seat on the Security
Council (Hart and Jones 2010: 73) .
Quantitative studies on the influence of US aid disbursements and UNGA voting corroborate this mechanism: increased levels of development assistance and the provision of aid (general budget support, grants) indeed buys votes in the UNGA (Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008; Wang 1999) . 9 In addition, trade dependence increases the responsiveness to external demands, including unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and other economic benefits, and causes the economically weaker states to accommodate the foreign policy interests of the more powerful one (Dreher , Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Keohane and Nye 1977) .
Similar mechanisms should function through military trade. Sullivan, Tessman and Li (2011: 279) argue theoretically that controlling arms transfers enables the more powerful state in a dyad to impose foreign policy choices on the (weaker) recipient state according to the 9 For a comparative study analyzing the effects of US and Soviet aid, see Rai (1980) ; on Soviet aid and trade, see Roeder (1985) and Imai (1992) . To the best of my knowledge, no similar analysis exists for the Chinese case.
Studies dealing directly with China in the UN concentrate on the identification of patterns of voting affinity with China in the UNGA (Chai 1979) or with China's general UN policy (Kim 1979 former's core interests. 10 The link between arms trade and foreign policy alignment should, thus, be observable in "small, poor countries (mainly in Africa) who cannot afford more advanced systems, and countries such as Burma and Sudan whose access to the global arms market is restricted" (Medeiros 2009: 91-92) . In addition, in those cases where China's arms trade is associated with further military activities such as high-level official visits and exchange programs, foreign policy similarity becomes even more likely due to the increased level of bilateral exchange (Ellis 2011a: 5-6 ).
Finally, strong political ties potentially further increase foreign policy similarity. The 
Research Design
The data set used to test these assumptions includes annual observations on the voting practices of all UN member states except China for the period from 1990 to 2011. 11 The sample period accounts, on the one hand, for the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and changing alignment patterns in the post-Cold War international system (Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000) .
On the other hand, it also includes the period during which China's external relations entered a phase of normalization and adjustment (in the 1990s) and Beijing began to promote its dip-10 However, the authors fail to prove this link in their statistical analysis (Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011: 290) . Derouen and Heo (2004: 467 ) also find only limited support for the strategic use of military assistance by the US to induce the accommodation of US foreign policy interests.
11 The population of the data set was generated using the EUGene software and has a total of 4,067 observations (Version 3.204) (Bennett and Stam 2000) .
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Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Similarity
The study's dependent variable measures foreign policy similarity with China on the basis of UNGA voting records. It is based on a similarity score ranging from -1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests) using the three main categories of UN voting data (approval, disapproval, abstentions). Drawing on this similarity score, I have created three binary depend- For the calculation of the similarity score, I draw on chance-corrected agreement indices (Häge 2011) . The procedure addresses the question of affinity in the same way as the widely used S score by measuring distances between state positions and then converting the dissimilarity into a similarity score (Signorino and Ritter 1999) . Häge, however, follows a different approach with regard to the standardization of dissimilarity values: for the "case where foreign policy ties are cheap" (for example, UNGA voting), he takes into account the fact that some differences between two countries' policy positions are "'harder' to achieve in the face of symmetrically unbalanced distributions (i.e., prevalence) than in the face of balanced marginal distributions" and, thus, corrects dissimilarity proportions upwards (Häge 2011: 294-295, 302) . A major consequence of the correction is that agreement indices are on average lower than the S score, do not concentrate at high levels of similarity, and, thus, are expected to provide a more realistic and conservative depiction of foreign policy similarity with China.
Using UNGA votes to calculate the similarity of states' foreign policy positions with China offers the advantage that data is available for all states in the international system, and for a long time period. Although the votes in the General Assembly are often criticized as being purely symbolic, the data comes with a further advantage: It is precisely because of the more symbolic nature of UNGA resolutions that voting in the General Assembly exhibits a higher level of variance than other foreign policy decisions (for example, a country's choice of alliance partners) and thus contains more information on a nation's foreign policy interests (Gartzke 2006; Voeten 2000) . However, one has to bear in mind that the resolutions' topics concentrate on international security, humanitarian and other political issues. Resolutions falling within the purview of the UNGA's Economic and Financial Committee account for only a small fraction of votes. Thus, the data has little meaning in terms of foreign policy similarity in this policy field.
12 With regard to the regional distribution of the similarity score in the recent past, the data reveals that a high degree of affinity is found mainly in Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as in Central Asian countries and North, South, and West African states (see Table A -2 in the Appendix). The findings also show that the Chinese government is receiving growing support for its foreign policy positions: particularly in the Caribbean, South America, Central and Western Asia, the proportion of shared votes has risen considerably in the last two decades. In contrast, very low (and decreasing) levels of similarity exist with the United States and Canada, as well as with European and Oceanian states.
Independent Variables
With regard to explanatory factors, the study contains two variables measuring shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and international affairs and a num- 
Empirical Strategy
The study employs logistic regression estimation with robust standard errors to test the hypotheses. The basic assumption is that the effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome become stronger among the group of countries with (very) high levels of foreign policy similarity and insignificant and/or negative in the case of foreign policy dissimilarity. Furthermore, I
separately estimate dynamic logistic models to test whether the explanatory variables affect the onset of foreign policy similarity, its duration or both. (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010) .
Quantitative Findings
To what extent do shared institutional and socioeconomic characteristics in domestic and international affairs and the presence of strong diplomatic, economic and military linkages help to explain foreign policy similarity? Tables 1 to 3 present the results of the empirical analysis on this question.
The statistical evidence strongly supports the assumption that much of the foreign policy similarity is related to shared political attributes and similar levels of sociopolitical globalization (Hypothesis 1a, 1b). The two respective variables' coefficients are positive and highly significant throughout models 1 to 5. The findings are corroborated by Model 6: when we choose foreign policy dissimilarity as the dependent variable, the coefficients of regime similarity and global involvement change numerical signs to become negative (Model 6 in Table 1 ). Expressed in odds ratios, a one-unit increase in regime similarity and global involvement reduces the chance of dissimilar foreign policy portfolios by approximately 16 and 14 percent, respectively, whereas it increases the probability of foreign policy similarity (p75) by 50 and 27 percent. 22 The control variables operate largely in line with the findings of previous studies. According to the expectations, foreign policy similarity exhibits high temporal dependence.
Each year that a country did not reach a high level of foreign policy similarity reduces the likelihood of future alignment significantly. Natural cubic splines generally support this claim.
Also, resourceful countries share, on average, Chinese foreign policy positions less often.
This effect, however, is restricted to industrial resources (capabilities (resources)).
A large population, in fact, increases the likelihood of foreign policy similarity. 23 21 This assumption will be relaxed by testing the two-year moving averages of aid and arms trade to account for the fact that both can be made an instrument for ex ante inducement and ex post reward or punishment.
22 The coefficients and odds ratios of all models are summarized in Table A -4 of the Appendix. In addition, I
have conducted an in-sample validation of the predictive power, as suggested by Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010) , of the models in tables 1 and 2. It confirms in general that the coefficients' levels of statistical significance are positively associated with their predictive power. Only in the case of export dependence is a low level of statistical significance combined with a substantial impact on predictive power.
The military dimension of national capabilities is not included due to its high correlation with capabilities (resources
). Furthermore, when tested in a separate model, it was not significant at conventional statistical levels. (Lampton 2008) . Only in the case of countries showing very high similarity levels (p90) does export dependence become statistically significant and, expressed in odds ratios, make it 14 times more
likely that countries will demonstrate a high level of foreign policy similarity (Table A- A positive effect of foreign aid disbursements on foreign policy similarity, as reported in the cited studies on US aid and voting in the UNGA, also seems to be valid in the China case.
Receiving funding for any number of aid projects from China makes bilateral foreign policy similarity more feasible. Although the coefficient for the binary aid variable does not reach significance at conventional statistical levels, it points in the right direction (Model 9). This link is demonstrated instead by the two-year moving average of the number of Chinese aid projects, which strongly correlates with the recipients' foreign policy similarity (Model 10).
This effect may be driven by the fact that for many aid projects there is a considerable time lapse between the first agreement and the project's realization. Moreover, it may indicate that more aid buys more support.
The contrary may be true for arms trade. The fact that a country has received major conventional weapons from China is more important in encouraging governments to align with China's foreign policy choices than the actual size of these deals (models 11 and 12). Taken together, the results on China's economic and military linkages provide general support for the plausibility of hypotheses 2b and 2c.
Finally, the results from estimating a combined model containing indicators for political, economic and military linkages are presented in Table 3 With regard to the question of whether the different explanatory factors are more likely to transmit influence in the form of ex ante inducements or ex post rewards, Table 3 further presents the separate estimations of dynamic logistic models.
The results of models 14 and 15 suggest that the explanatory variables can be divided into three groups with different effects on foreign policy similarity: First, initial evidence is provided that political ties through shared membership in a large number of intergovernmental organizations as well as significant trade dependence on China are less a prerequisite of foreign policy similarity than a consequence and help to maintain it. Second, shared regime characteristics and comparable patterns of sociopolitical involvement in the international system seem to be important facilitating factors for foreign policy similarity, independently from the focus on onset or duration. The respective coefficients throughout the models in Table 3 are all positive and statistically significant. Third, some evidence is provided that only the implementation of aid projects and the supply of major conventional weapons by China induce foreign policy similarity. 
Discussion of Results
The results ings "that at least the US tend to use aid more often as an reward for a country's prior voting alignment than as an ex ante inducement" (Derouen and Heo 2004: 468) On the other hand, it seems that China's economic influence is not based on its power as a buyer. Rather, the results indicate that a good political understanding is conducive to high levels of economic exchange with China. Thus, contrary to common wisdom, the assumption that economic interdependence provides a source of direct political influence in asymmetrical relations, which goes back to Hirschman's (1980 Hirschman's ( [1945 ) work on state power and international trade patterns, may be only one side of the story (Wagner 1988: 472) . If we extend the liberal peace argument, we can expect that trade interdependence leads to converging foreign policy interests in the long run because it eases interstate cooperation (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008: 155; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003: 374) . 25 This argument may be translated to the political dimension, as the results on shared membership in intergovernmental organizations suggest.
Conclusion
The primary aim of this paper has been to assess the plausibility of different theoretical explanations for similarities between a state's foreign policy choices and China's diplomatic in- Finally, future studies on China's rise and the country's perceived growing influence in international relations should abandon the rigid concentration on economic statecraft. Instead, they should focus on China's ability to mobilize supporters among "like-minded" countries in order to achieve its goals in international politics, and on its establishment of intergovernmental foreign policy networks in order to ease policy coordination and cooperation with major countries in the Global South. This paper's findings further suggest that over the course of its economic and political rise China has indeed become a "friend" or "beacon" to many leaders of developing countries in the Global South.
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